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written. Therefore the conclusions of the Board exceed the bounds 
of reasonableness. 
The Board entered findings that are not supported by 
substantial evidence with respect to Factors A, B, C, J and P. As 
a result of the unsubstantiated findings the Board came to 
unreasonable conclusions. It is not a matter of reviewing two 
reasonably conflicting views. It is a complete, or near complete, 
lack of evidence that Board used to justify its conclusions. This 
exceeds the bounds of reasonableness. 
The Board went beyond its authority contained in the 
remand order in changing its conclusions on Factors C, E, 0f S 
and T. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE BOARD'S CONCLUSIONS ON FACTORS E, I, G, D, 
Hf Q AND N ARE UNREASONABLE BECAUSE THE BOARD 
FAILED TO FOLLOW THE ACT. 
The Respondent's Brief failed to address Tasters' 
arguments that the Board came to unreasonable conclusions regarding 
Factors E, I, G, D and N of the Act and therefore came to unreason-
able conclusions. The Board failed to properly apply the facts to 
the Act and is not giving effect to the Legislative intent. The 
Board's conclusions should be reversed because they are unreason-
able. Tasters Ltd., Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 819 
P.2d 361 (Utah App. 1991). While these Factors are completely 
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The Board unreasonably changed its conclusion. The 
Board's First Decision concluded independent contractor status. 
The Board's Second Decision concluded Factor E was "not helpful." 
Both sides agree that the employee side of the factor was not met. 
The Board should have concluded, as it did in its First Decision, 
that the findings with respect to Factor E support a conclusion of 
independent contractor status. 
2. Factor I. Factor I requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual uses his or her own office, desk, telephone 
or other equipment or is physically within the employer's direction 
and supervision." Emphasis added. 
The Legislature wrote the Act. The Respondent is 
attempting to re-write the Act when it states: "The factor 
requires an examination of whether the individual works at his or 
her own place of business or at a place of business of the 
employer." Respondent's Brief p. 20. The Act does not require an 
examination of whether a demonstrator has his "own place of 
business." Clearly, the Act does not require an examination as 
suggested by Respondent's Brief. 
The Act requires the Board to determine whether the 
worker uses their own office, desk, telephone or equipment. The 
Board found demonstrators use their own equipment. R. 528. 
Therefore, the independent contractor side of the factor is 
fulfilled. 
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It is clear that the demonstrators are not physically 
within Tasters' physical supervision. R. 152, 192, 199. Therefore 
it is not possible to find employee status. 
The Board and the Respondent's Brief unreasonably applied 
the Act. The independent contractor side of Factor I was met and 
the employee side was not. The only reasonable conclusion is that 
Factor I indicates independent contractor status. 
3. Factor G. Factor G requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual establishes his or her own time schedule or 
does the employer set the time schedule." 
It is undisputed by both parties that Tasters does not 
set the time schedule. The Board made that finding. R. 525, 526. 
Therefore, it is not possible to read the Act and conclude employee 
status on Factor G. The employer side of Factor E was not met. No 
reasonable person can find that Tasters does not set the time 
schedule and conclude employee status. The Board's conclusion is 
an unreasonable application of the Act. 
4. Factors D, H, 0 and N. Factors D (assignment) , 
H (full time) , Q (works for a number of firms) , and N (tools) were 
unreasonably determined by the Board to have minimal significance. 
The Board concluded Factor D minimally indicated indepen-
dent contractor status. The independent contractor test is whether 
the services may be assigned. The Board reasonably found an 
individual "may assign the services" but goes on to state that 
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"they do so only rarely," to justify the conclusion of minimal 
significance. R. 554. Frequency is not the test. The demonstra-
tors, not Tasters, control the assignments. The Board's conclusion 
that Factor D has minimal significance is an unreasonable applica-
tion of the Act because the Board adds a new test to the Act. 
The Board concluded Factor H had minimal significance. 
Whether an individual is free to work when and for whom he chooses 
is the independent contractor test written by the Legislature. 
Whether or not full time is required is the employee's side of the 
factor. Independence or control are the ultimate tests in 
determining whether an individual is an independent contractor or 
an employee. The only reasonable conclusion is that an individual 
who is free to work when and for whom he or she chooses, as are the 
demonstrators, indicates independent contractor status. Giving 
this factor minimum significance exceeds the bounds of reasonable-
ness. 
The Board concluded that Factor N supports independent 
contractor status but only gave it minimal significance. The 
furnishing of tools is undeniably a strong factor showing indepen-
dent contractor status. In fact, it is the test written in the 
Act. The Board's conclusion "that the tools are not a kind 
associated with an independent venture" is not supported by any 
evidence and is beyond what is stated in the Act. The Act does not 
ask whether the tools are the kind associated with an independent 
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venture. The demonstrators, not Tasters, provide the tools to 
perform their job. The Board again failed to follow the Act as 
written. The Board unreasonably determined the factor to have 
minimal significance. 
Factor Q was also found to have had minimal significance 
showing independent contractor status. Whether an individual works 
for a number of persons or firms at the same time or usually works 
for only one employer is a strong test of independent contractor or 
employee. Employees generally only work for one employer. The 
demonstrators work for a number of persons or firms at the same 
time. Some demonstrators compete with Tasters. It exceeds the 
bounds of reasonableness to determine this factor to be of minimal 
significance. 
II. THE BOARD ENTERED FINDINGS THAT ARE NOT SUP-
PORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN LIGHT OF THE 
WHOLE RECORD OR COMPLETELY IGNORED UNCONTRO-
VERTED EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD ON FACTORS A, B, 
C, J AND P AND CAME TO UNREASONABLE CONCLU-
SIONS. 
The Board must use the evidence in the proceeding to make 
its Findings of Fact. First National Bank v. County Board of 
Equalizations. 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990). 
Although it is a "universally recog-
nized rule that this Court must take 
some recognizance of the expertise 
of the agency in its particular 
field and accordingly give it some 
difference to its determination". 
The Agency's decision must rest upon 
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some sound evidentiary basis, not a 
creation of fiat. 
Id. 1164. The Board made findings not supported by evidence in the 
record. The Respondents did not respond or its arguments fail as 
described below. 
1. Factor A. Factor A requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual works his or her own schedule or is 
required to comply with another person's instructions about when, 
where and how the work is to be performed." Emphasis added. 
The Respondent's Brief did not respond to Tasters' 
arguments. The Board and the Respondent's Brief rely on a document 
entitled "Very Important Things to Remember." However, there is no 
substantial evidence to support the Board's position regarding this 
document. 
The Respondent's Brief attempts to argue that the 
document is a requirement. However, Respondent does not have any 
facts to support the argument. 
The document was entered into evidence over Tasters' 
objection for lack of foundation. R. 141. The Department after 
offering the document into evidence did not ask questions about the 
document. Tasters President, Cohn, testified that the document was 
a suggestion sent to some demonstrators with questions. R. 232. 
The Department did not cross examine Cohn about her statement. 
There is no testimony from any person that it is a requirement, as 
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the Act requires. There is no testimony that the document is given 
to every demonstrator. Further, the demonstrators themselves 
testified they determine how the work is done. R. 190. The 
demonstrators consider that they can work when and where they want 
and are free to accept or decline work. R. 144, 162, 171, 201, 
204, 205. 
The Board entered the Finding that "Tasters gives such 
demonstrators two pages of written instructions governing the 
performance of their duties . . ., " without any support in the 
record. Neither the First Decision, Second Decision nor the 
Respondent's Brief relies on any facts cited to the record. This 
finding which is not supported by substantial evidence led the 
Board to an unreasonable conclusion. The only reasonable conclu-
sion is that Factor A supports the independent contractor status 
because the demonstrators control their own schedule. 
2. Factor B. Factor B requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual uses his or her own methods and requires no 
specific training from the purchaser, or is trained by an experi-
enced employee working with him or her, is required to take 
correspondence or other courses, attend meetings, and by other 
methods indicates that the employer wants the services performed." 
Emphasis added. 
Respondent's Brief incorrectly quotes this factor causing 
Respondent to come to an unreasonable conclusion. The Respondent's 
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Brief incorrectly substitutes the word "or" when the Act uses the 
conjunctive word "and," to connect to the words "by other means 
indicates that the employer wants the services performed." 
Respondent's Brief p. 24. The Respondent's entire argument is 
based upon the alternative use of the list of factors rather than 
the all inclusive requirement of all of the factors as required by 
the word "and". 
The Board made a finding that meetings were not mandato-
ry. The Board also found Tasters provided written instructions on 
how the work was to be performed. R. 525. The Board then found 
employee status. The Board unreasonably failed to follow the Act 
as written. 
All the elements of the employee side of the factor have 
not been met. It is uncontroverted that the demonstrators are not 
trained by an experienced employee working with him or her, R. 218; 
that a demonstrator is not required to take correspondence or other 
courses, R. 182# 218; and that a demonstrator is not required to 
attend meetings. R. 182, 218. As the Act uses the conjunctive 
word "and" on the employee side of the factor, the Board's finding, 
that Tasters provides written instructions about how the work is to 
be done, is irrelevant. Further, that finding is not supported by 
any substantial evidence in the record as argued under Factor A 
above. 
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There is overwhelming evidence that the demonstrators use 
their own methods and require no specific training to perform their 
demonstrations. R. 101, 102, 148, 151, 152, 159, 185, 186, 190. 
The Board made its conclusion based upon facts not in the 
record. The Board unreasonably applied the Act because all the 
elements on the employee side of the factor are not present. The 
Board ignored substantial facts in the record. This factor clearly 
shows independent contractor status because all the elements of the 
independent contractor side of the factor have been met. 
3. Factor C. Factor C requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual's services are independent of the success 
or continuation of a business or are merged into the business where 
success and continuation of the business depends upon those 
services and the employer coordinates work with work of others." 
The Respondent's Brief suggests there is evidence in the 
record to support the Board's conclusions concerning Factor C. 
However, the Respondent's Brief fails to cite to the record. The 
First Decision found this factor to be "of little significance." 
R. 429. There is no evidence cited by the Board or the Respond-
ent's Brief to support the Second Decision of employee status. The 
Board's conclusions in its First Decision that it is not "not 
useful" is the only reasonable conclusion because there is no 
evidence. The conclusion of the Board in the Second Decision is 
unreasonable because there is no evidence. 
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4. Factor J. Factor J requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual is free to perform services at his or her 
own pace or perform services in the order of sequence set by the 
employer." 
The Respondent argues, without any support from the 
record, that the conclusion on pacing was based on the 
demonstrators' own account of their jobs. Respondent's Brief 
p. 21. The Respondent did not cite to the record nor did the 
Board. The account of a demonstrator's job concerning pacing was 
clearly stated by a demonstrator, who said she set her own pace. 
R. 205. Cohn, similarly testified. R. 224, 225. Neither the 
Board nor the Respondent's Brief offered any reference to the 
record. It is unreasonable for the Board and the Respondent's 
Brief to ignore uncontradicted evidence in the record. The only 
reasonable conclusion is that Factor J supports independent 
contractor status. 
5. Factor P. Factor P requires the Board to determine 
"whether the individual may realize a profit or suffer a loss as a 
result of services performed or cannot realize a profit or a loss 
by making good or poor decisions." 
The Respondent's Brief seems to agree with the Board's 
First Decision that this factor is "of little significance." It 
argues that Tasters did not present relevant evidence. The 
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Respondent's Brief does not show that there is any evidence in the 
record on the employee side of the factor. 
Tasters argues in its Brief of Petitioner that the record 
shows that demonstrators, nor Tasters, will pay for their own 
damage or liability. R. 194, 230, 234-243. Tasters asserts this 
factor indicates independent contractor status. A conclusion, as 
in the Board's First Decision, that this factor is of little 
significance can be justified. A conclusion of employee status 
cannot be justified by any reasonable analysis because there is no 
evidence on the employee side of the factor. 
III. THE BOARD WENT BEYOND ITS AUTHORITY IN CHANG-
ING CONCLUSIONS AS FACTORS C, E, 0, M, S 
AND T. 
The Board was unreasonable in changing its conclusion on 
Factors C, 0 and M that were found in the First Decision to be "not 
significant." The Respondent's Brief argues "those shifts 
occurred, as already pointed out in this Brief, not because the 
Board of Review changed its mind with regard to particular factors, 
but because when viewed individually instead of groups of factors, 
the factors were given individual attention and accordingly their 
appropriate significance." Respondent's Brief p. 33, 34. The 
First Decision did give an individual determination to each of 
those factors and surely followed the Act to "analyze all of the 
factors" before it placed them in the group of "not significant." 
In the First Decision the Board found Factors C, F, H, 0, P, Q and 
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R to be in the second group and stated "In conclusion, most factors 
in this category are not significant in evaluating Tasters' control 
over its demonstrators, except Factor R . . ." R. 405. Clearly, 
the Board had given each of those factors individual attention in 
its First Decision. Changing Factors C, D, and M from "not" 
helpful to employee status was not permitted under the remand 
order. Additionally, the Board's conclusions in the First Decision 
that Factor E, S and T support independent contractor status was 
not permitted to be changed to "not helpful" or employee status in 
the Second Decision. The Board should have followed the Court of 
Appeals' decision and made subsidiary findings to the First 
Decision "as to why some factors were insignificant and why other 
factors were considered significant." Tasters, R. 516. 
CORRECTION TO BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
Page 17 of the Brief of Petitioners incorrectly stated 
that the Board's Second Decision found Factors L, Q, D, H and N to 
indicate employee status. The Board found these factors to 
indicate independent contractor status. 
CONCLUSION 
The Board failed to thoroughly read the Act as written by 
the Legislature. This caused the Board to come to incorrect 
conclusions. It is not a matter of interpreting the Act. It is 
the Board's ignoring the Act as it is written. It exceeds the 
bounds of a reasonableness for the Board not to apply the Act as 
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written. This Court should change the conclusions of the Board on 
Factors E, G and I and conclude that the facts as found by the 
Board require a conclusion of independent contractor status. 
Further, those factors found to have minimal significance were not 
determined to have minimal significance by authority granted by the 
Act. While the Act allows the evidence to be weighed it does not 
allow the application of tests not in the Act. The Factors as 
written go to the very crux of the issue between independent 
contractor and employee and deal with elements of control. 
Minimizing the significance of Factors D, H, N and Q is unreason-
able. 
The Board entered findings in Factors A, B, C, J and P 
that were not supported by substantial evidence viewed in light of 
the whole record. There is no evidence that: Tasters gave written 
instructions concerning Factors A or B; that there is no pacing 
involved in the work as in Factor J; and there is evidence to 
decide Factors C and P as determined by the Board. Therefore, the 
Board came to unreasonable conclusions on these Factors. 
The Board committed error in changing its conclusions 
from its First Decision. The Court of Appeals requested it to make 
findings as to why some factors were insignificant and why others 
were considered significant. If the Board would have followed the 
Court of Appeals decision and left its conclusions as in its First 
Decision, finding six factors showing independent contractor status 
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and five factors showing employee status and nine factors as not 
useful, the parties could have more clearly dealt with the issues. 
The Board in changing its conclusions on 11 out of the 20 factors 
unreasonably complicated this matter, and required Petitioner to 
write its briefs not knowing whether the First Decision or Second 
Decision applied. Petitioner was forced to analyze the findings 
and conclusions from both decisions, which are inconsistent. This 
Court could send this case back to the Board of Review to find why 
the factors in the First Decision were considered significant or 
not significant and compensate Petitioner with attorneys' fees for 
the writing of these briefs. 
The Respondent, with the exception of two findings, has 
accepted 52 of the 54 proposed findings by Tasters. This Court 
should adopt those findings. This Court should conclude that the 
findings support a conclusion that Factors A, B, D, E, G, H, I, J, 
L, N, P, Q, S and T indicate independent contractor status and that 
Factors K and R show employee status and Factors C, F, M and 0 are 
not useful. Petitioner requests that the Court find that the First 
and Second Decisions of the Board exceeds the bounds of reasonable-
ness, and hold that the only reasonable conclusion is that the 
demonstrators are independent contractors. 
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